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Microfinance Impact
Assessments:
The Perils of Using
New Members as a
Control Group
by Dean S. Karlan
Abstract: Microfinance institutions aim to reduce poverty. Some assess
their impact through a cross-sectional impact methodology which
compares veteran to new participants and then calls any difference
between these two groups the “impact” of the program. Such studies
have risen recently in popularity because they are cheap, easy to
implement, and often encouraged by donors. USAID, through its
AIMS project, encourages this methodology with its SEEP/AIMS
practitioner-oriented tools. This paper intends to inform practitioners
about the perils of using such a strategy, and suggests a couple of solutions to some of the larger problems with this approach.

Introduction
Microfinance institutions aim to reduce poverty. Some assess
their impact through a cross-sectional impact methodology
which compares veteran to new participants and then calls any
difference between these two groups the “impact” of the program. Such studies have risen recently in popularity because
they are cheap, easy to implement, and often encouraged by
donors. USAID, through its AIMS project, encourages this
methodology with its SEEP/AIMS practitioner-oriented tools.
This paper intends to inform practitioners about the perils of
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using such a strategy, and suggests a couple of solutions to
some of the larger problems with this approach.
This cross-sectional approach makes many assumptions
that are untested and others that are tested and false. For example, it assumes that drop outs have, on average, identical
income and consumption levels to those who remain.
Furthermore, this approach assumes that drop outs are not
made worse off by participating in the program. This approach
also assumes that when lending groups form they do not sort
themselves by economic background. These assumptions not
only are brave theoretically but are contradicted by existing
empirical research. This paper suggests a method to address the
above issues, and suggests further research be conducted on the
other implicit assumptions before expending resources on a
plausibly unreliable assessment methodology.
This paper proceeds as follows: the next section describes
the cross-sectional methodology as implemented by USAID
and the SEEP/AIMS practitioner-oriented methodology; the
following three sections discuss problems created by drop out,
by the selection process, by the dynamic nature of credit policy. Then potential solutions to some, but not all, of the problems are discussed.

Cross-Sectional Impact Assessments
A valid control group is the holy grail of any microfinance
impact assessment and must have participants who possess the
same “entrepreneurial spirit” as those in the treatment group
that receive the loans. The cross-sectional approach claims to
fulfill this requirement since both its control and treatment
group consist of individuals who have opted to participate in
the microfinance institution (MFI). The new entrants are the
control group, whereas the veteran participants with two or
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more years experience with the MFI are the treatment group.
The methodology then attributes any difference between these
groups to the MFI, since the new entrants have received little
or no treatment from the MFI, but the veterans have received
two or more years of loans.
The AIMS practitioner-oriented tools developed by
USAID explain this process in detail (SEEP Network, 1999). In
this approach, survey takers measure current income and consumption of members, both old and new, in an MFI. Then the
analysis compares the income and consumption levels between
old and new members. If the mean spending on food, for example, is higher for veteran members than new entrants, then the
methodology concludes that participation in the microfinance
program led to higher food consumption for its participants.
Advocates like this approach because of two operational
advantages: no need to identify and survey nonparticipants in
order to generate a control group and no need to follow clients
over time as in a longitudinal study.

Dropout
Dropout causes two major problems. The first is an incomplete
sample bias and the second is an attrition bias. The incomplete
sample bias is created because those who drop out presumably
were impacted differently, and potentially worse, than those
who remained. Since an impact assessment should examine the
impact of the program in its entirety, not just of its success
cases, these individuals must be considered as well. The attrition bias is created because those who drop out are different
from those who remain, irrespective of the program impact
(e.g., wealthier participants stay and poorer participants drop
out). Both are serious problems and somewhat easy to address,
but the standard AIMS practitioner tools do not resolve them.

Incomplete Sample Bias
For simplicity, think of two types of participants, those who
benefit from participation and those who are made worse off.
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Those who benefit invest the loan proceeds in their business
and generate more additional income than the interest they pay
on their loan. These people stay in the program. Those who
are made worse off fail to invest the money well and then drop
out of the program. By including only those who remain in the
program in the treatment group, those who suffer a negative
impact are ignored. The cross-sectional impact analysis would
find a positive impact, whereas the true impact depends
entirely on the relative size of these two groups and how much
they are benefited or are made worse off.
The above scenario assumes that drop out is generated by
failure. Now assume that dropout is generated by success.
After successfully improving their business, learning to manage their money, and developing their own savings base, clients
no longer need the credit and hence leave the program. In this
scenario, the cross-sectional impact analysis would underestimate impact since the greatest successes are ignored in the
analysis.

Attrition Bias
Again for simplicity, think of two types of participants, rich
and poor. Suppose for the moment that the program has no
impact whatsoever, neither positive nor negative, on any participant. Who drops out? If the rich drop out, the “veteran”
pool will consist only of the poor types. Then, a comparison
of veterans to new participants will conclude a negative
impact, since the veterans are only poor but the new participants are a mix of rich and poor. On the other hand, if the
poor are more likely to drop out, the “veteran” pool will consist only of the rich. Then, a comparison of veterans to new
participants will conclude a positive impact, since the veterans
are only rich but the new participants are a mix of rich and
poor. Note in both of these stylized cases, there was no impact
whatsoever; hence, drop out is not “failure” in this case,
merely bad fit. Yet the cross-sectional methodology produced
a positive impact (if the poorer individuals are more likely to
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drop out) or a negative impact (if the richer individuals are
more likely to drop out).

Selection
A selection bias refers to the problem of attributing causation
to a program with voluntary selection. Those who participate
in microfinance programs are more entrepreneurial in spirit,
more resourceful in business, and hence more likely to overcome life’s problems one way or another. Attributing their
success to microfinance then becomes difficult. The crosssectional impact assessment purports to overcome this problem, since those in both the treatment and control groups
self-selected into the program. This claim only examines the
selection bias statically and fails to realize the full dynamics of
the decision to participate. Why did those in the treatment
group join two years ago whereas those in the control group
just joined? The answer is important. Do participants join only
at certain points in life? Or if peer selection determines participation, why was one person chosen two years ago and the
other not until recently?

Timing of Decision Problem
Why does someone join a credit program now rather than two
years ago? I do not know, but I intuit that there is a reason, and
it is significant. Imagine that individuals join after coming to
an epiphany that they must grow their business in order to pull
themselves out of poverty. Or perhaps participants join when
everyone in their household is healthy, and hence does not
need constant care in the home. Such a situation suggests that
perhaps access to credit is not the problem, but rather access to
good health care. If ample opportunities exist for credit and
savings in their community, then attributing the improvement
in their lives to the microfinance institution would be erroneous. Their epiphany or their family’s health should get full
credit.
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One way to address this problem is to analyze the alternatives for credit and savings that clients have in their communities. Since social networks can create both credit opportunities
(e.g., informal loans) and savings opportunities (e.g., Rotating
Savings and Credit Associations, ROSCAs), evaluating a
client’s next-best alternative is not an easy task. Further
research to understand the informal opportunities to borrow
and save is essential for understanding the seriousness of the
timing problem.

Peer Selection Problem
Imagine banks form through a process like a draft for sports
players. The best candidates get drafted first, the good-but-notbest candidates get drafted second, and so. Theory suggests
(Ghatak, 2000) and evidence supports (J. Hatch, personal communication, 1997) that individuals are selected into banks in
just this way, assortatively by quality of participants, where
wealth is used by peers as a proxy for quality. Hence, one
group to form in a community contains the best off; the second
will be slightly less well off, etc. Again, without any impact at
all, a naïve cross-sectional analysis would find veterans have
higher wealth than new participants and would attribute this
difference to program impact. In fact, if one is targeting the
poorest of the poor, then finding positive impact through this
method suggests failure since it suggests that perhaps the
wealthier are always served first. This issue is heightened by
the SEEP/AIMS practitioner-tools because their tools specifically instruct practitioners to use two-year-old banks for the
two-year-old veteran pool, one-year-old banks for the oneyear-old veteran pool, and new banks for the new entrant pool.
The point of the above story is not limited to the stylized
case provided. Take the following scenario as another potential
situation. The poorest join first because they are the ones willing to take the risk of participating in this unknown project.
Next come the better off clients who only moved once they saw
the product tested. Then come the middle tranche. In this scenario, comparing new entrants to veterans will underestimate
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impact, since the veterans will have started out poorer than the
new entrants.

Institutional Dynamics
Microfinance institutions change their strategies and/or client
identification process, and such changes could affect materially
the composition of a new versus veteran participant pool. If
any such change systematically alters the relative wealth or
income of the new versus veteran participants, again a naïve
cross-sectional analysis would erroneously attribute differences
to impact. I will discuss two plausible scenarios, both of which
I have witnessed in the field.

Program Placement
Microfinance institutions typically have a multi-year strategy
for which communities to enter and why. Suppose, quite reasonably, that a young microfinance institution prefers to start
out cautiously, and hence enters slightly more well-off communities. Then, after achieving comfort with the local culture,
economy, and business practices, the MFI branches out to the
poorer neighborhoods. In this situation the veteran participants would all be wealthier than the new participants even if
the program has no impact. Hence, a naïve cross-sectional
analysis would erroneously attribute impact to the program
success. The SEEP/AIMS practitioner-oriented tools try to
address this issue by instructing practitioners to choose similar
neighborhoods. Assuming the similar communities exist, this
might work, but if the implementation plan follows the pattern described above, similar-enough neighborhoods simply
might not exist. This becomes a timing issue for the practitioner: at what point in the implementation of the plan will
the practitioner learn that no valid control communities exist?
Changes in Credit Requirements
Just like banks, MFIs often respond to changes in the economy
by tightening or loosening their credit requirement. In a recession, when even microentrepreneurs are hurt, MFIs might be
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more stringent about the credit criteria for participating. Or
perhaps they are more lenient. If tighter credit requirements
effectively filter out the poorest of the poor, then individuals
who join during a recession will be better off than those who
join in a normal or boom time. Or if policy becomes more
lenient, individuals who would not have previously received
credit now do. If the impact assessment is being conducted in
the middle of a recession, and two years earlier the economy
was either normal or in a boom, then the new participants will
be more well off than the veteran participants. In this situation,
a cross-sectional analysis will underestimate the true impact of
the program. Or if policy becomes more lenient, the analysis
will overestimate the true impact of the program. The point
here is not which direction the bias is, but rather that this
approach to impact assessment demands that no such policy
change is made, whereas reality dictates that policy does change
as the economy changes.

Solutions
The dropout biases are particularly important when attrition
is high. Both dropout problems are solvable within the constraints of the one-shot, cross-sectional AIMS approach.
Although the current SEEP/AIMS tools do not address the
problem, a change to the sampling technique can solve both
problems. Conceptually, the two samples are not the same:
the veteran group consists only of those who remain, whereas
the new member group consists of members who will drop
out. One can alter the veteran group to include those who
drop out, or can alter the new member group to include only
those expected to remain. The first approach is far better and
solves both of the problems. The second approach requires
some econometric work and solves only the second problem.
As discussed earlier, one major issue is that those who drop
out probably were impacted differently than those who remain,
and any analysis which ignores them is akin to cherry-picking
one’s successes, ignoring one’s failures, and then claiming victory. The solution requires conducting the “veteran” survey on
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a sample of members who were in the bank two years ago,
some of which are still present but others of which have
dropped out. Then the analysis which compares consumption
and income levels across veteran and new groups would
include the complete “veteran” pool. This approach solves
both the incomplete sample and the biased-dropout problems.
It would be important when implementing this approach to
sample randomly the veterans to interview (not just pick those
easiest to contact) and to pursue them diligently. A recent
study in Indonesia found that the extra effort to pursue the difficult-to-find pays off tremendously, as these individuals are
significantly different from those who remain in their neighborhoods and are easy to reach (see, for example, Thomas,
Frankenberg, Beegle, and Teruel, 2000).
The second approach requires combining the data on the
veteran members and the dropouts to attempt to find predictors of dropout. The predictors must be observable when
someone enters since they will be used to predict which new
members will drop out. For instance, distance to the meeting
place, number of family members in the lending group, age of
business, history of prior credit use, and history of prior savings are all observable and plausibly predictive of dropout.
Using this information, one would then use econometric tools
to predict who will remain amongst the new members, and
then weight the new entrant sample according to their probabilities of remaining. As long as poverty is correlated with
some of the observable information used to predict dropout,
this solves the second dropout problem. However, this does
not solve the first problem discussed, since we have simply
modeled who will drop out, not who will have the biggest
impact. The veteran sample still contains only those with positive impacts and ignores those with negative or no impact.

Conclusion
The impact evaluation debate rages on in microfinance. Some
believe all impact evaluations are useless, but targeting evaluaVolume 3 Number 2
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tions are appropriate to ensure at the minimum that the clients
are the intended recipients. Others believe that mid-level
impact evaluations, such as the one analyzed here, are useful
and informative. As this paper highlights, the dropout biases
inherent in a cross-sectional impact evaluation are problematic
but solvable. However, the selection and institutional dynamics problems are more difficult. Depending on the circumstances in a given project and economic setting, these issues
suggest that any findings cannot be attributed easily to the project, and hence the cross-sectional approach is not appropriate.
A solid understanding of the selection process, economic environment, and institutional dynamics is important in deciding
whether or not to employ this mid-level, cross-sectional
approach.
An alternative to mid-level impact assessments would be a
two-prong approach, with many “targeting” evaluations and a
few methodologically rigorous longitudinal evaluations. The
“targeting” evaluations would be small, frequent tools which
monitor client targeting (but do not claim to measure impact),
combined with institutional analysis which examines, from a
management perspective, the efficiency and flexibility with
which a program delivers its services. The longitudinal studies
would have proper control groups, which follow all members,
including dropouts. Such projects could inform the rest of the
microfinance community about proper targeting, impact, and
mechanism design issues. Ideally such studies also would test
different product designs, so that one could assess the differential impact of one product over another. Organizations which
conduct such studies would be contributing to a public good,
wherein other MFIs can learn from their studies and learn how
to target better and design better products so as to achieve their
primary goal, poverty alleviation, more effectively.
Creating a control group in a longitudinal study does not
necessarily imply impositions to operations. This author, for
instance, is currently working on a longitudinal impact study in
urban South Africa, where the control group is randomly cre84
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ated and hence strong methodologically. The process is of little
to no cost, and is even a benefit, to operations. The strategy
took advantage of the natural organizational limitations of a
project as it entered a new area. Not all MFIs are in the situation to do what is necessary to conduct such a study, but if
enough are, and the studies are conducted, then we as a community can learn more about whether MFIs can alleviate poverty,
who we can help the most, and how we can best help them.

Notes
Thanks to Iris Lanao for discussions and for inviting me to observe the training of a cross-sectional impact assessment led by AIMS for FINCA-Peru, and to
Dale Adams, Monique Cohen, Barbara MkNelly, and Gary Woller for discussions and comments for this paper.
1. The author bases the analysis of the AIMS tools on his personal observation of the evaluation tools being implemented by AIMS for FINCA-Peru, and
the draft version of the practitioner tools manual.
2. Specifically in the case of FINCA International, Hatch found that older
banks invited wealthier individuals to participate than did younger banks, and
that new banks in old areas were poorer than old banks in old areas.
3. Proper control groups are particularly difficult to create for microfinance
impact studies since the entrepreneurial spirit of participants is presumably quite
unique. Hence, merely finding "similar" individuals as a control group does not
solve this problem.
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